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PRIVACY BEFORE TRADE:
ASSESSING THE WTO-CONSISTENCY OF PRIVACY-BASED CROSSBORDER DATA FLOW RESTRICTIONS
Julian Rotenberg ∗
ABSTRACT
The first decades of the 21st century have been characterized by the
growth of digital trade fueled by new business models based on cross-border
data flows. With data taking a central role in the digital economy,
governments and their constituents have become increasingly concerned
about the commercial handling and commoditization of personal data.
Consequently, governments have entered the business of regulating crossborder data flows, especially with the aim of protecting the privacy of their
citizens. This regulatory trend does not occur in a vacuum: The World Trade
Organization (WTO) through the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) regulates the types of measures and treatment that governments may
adopt regarding foreign providers of digital services. Further, several Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) include electronic commerce or digital trade
chapters establishing obligations regarding cross-border data flows. This
paper focuses on cross-border data flow restrictions aimed at protecting
privacy and the assessment of their WTO-consistency. This perspective covers
a broader range of measures and offers a more comprehensive understanding
of privacy regulations before trade fora than the existing literature does. In
particular, this paper draws attention to the assessment of privacy-based
restrictions under the GATS exceptions and argues that the necessity test and
chapeau requirements will prove critical in any future adjudication over
complaints against a country’s policies restricting cross-border data transfers.
This analysis highlights that the linkage between trade and privacy will
continue to intensify and that this linkage will be further shaped by countries
being taken to court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The first decades of the 21st century have been characterized
by the growth of digital trade fueled by, and in turn contributing to the
expansion of, new business models based on cross-border data flows.
With data taking a central role in today’s digital economy,
governments and their constituents have become increasingly
concerned about the commercial handling and commoditization of
personal data. Consequently, governments around the world have
entered the business of regulating cross-border data flows, especially
with the aim of protecting the privacy of their citizens.
This regulatory trend does not occur in a vacuum. Most
countries in the global economy are members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), which under the General Agreement on Trade in
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Services (GATS) regulates the types of measures and treatment that
countries can adopt regarding foreign providers of digital services.
Further, several countries are parties to Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
that include electronic commerce or digital trade chapters establishing
obligations regarding cross-border data flows.
Data flows and data protection are central components of
economic and trade policy in the digital era. When a country restricts
cross-border data transfers with the aim of protecting privacy, it might
incur breaches of legal obligations owed to other countries and firms.
Considering the relevance of cross-border data flows and the potential
economic impact of restrictions, countries may soon begin to face
international litigation against their measures. On an inter-state basis,
this could occur at the multilateral level before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body. It could also occur at the regional or bilateral level,
under an FTA replicating the GATS framework or otherwise
governing data regulations. Although beyond the scope of this paper,
these measures might also give rise to litigation by foreign firms under
International Investment Agreements (IIAs) providing for investorstate arbitration.
Until recently, scholarly studies of international trade law and
privacy have remained independent from each other. An emerging
literature is now beginning to trace the connections between these two
fields, focusing on the applicability of the GATS framework to privacy
and cybersecurity laws. 1 However, most of these efforts have tended
to focus on data localization measures, while other types of privacybased restrictions have not been sufficiently addressed.
This paper contributes to bridging this gap by focusing on
cross-border data flow restrictions aimed at protecting privacy and the
1
See, e.g., Neha Mishra, Privacy, Cybersecurity, and GATS Article XIV: A New
Frontier for Trade and Internet Regulation?, WORLD TRADE REVIEW 1 (2019); Ines
Willemyns, The GATS (In)Consistency of Barriers to Digital Services Trade, 207
LEUVEN CTR. FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE STUDIES WORKING PAPER (2018),
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/2018/wp207willemyns.pdf; Daniel Crosby, Analysis of Data Localization Measures Under WTO
Services Trade Rules and Commitments, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEV. & WORLD ECON. F. E15INITIATIVE (2016), http://e15initiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/E15-Policy-Brief-Crosby-Final.pdf; Diane A. MacDonald,
& Christine M. Streatfeild, Personal Data Privacy and the WTO, 36 HOUSTON J. INT’L
L. 625 (2014).
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assessment of their WTO-consistency. This perspective covers a
broader range of measures than data localization requirements and
offers a more comprehensive understanding of privacy regulations
before trade fora than the existing literature does.
The paper draws attention to the need to assess privacy-based
restrictions under the GATS exceptions. It argues that the necessity test
and the chapeau requirements will prove critical in any future
adjudication over complaints against a country’s policies restricting
cross-border data transfers, emphasizing the need for countries to
focus on this line of argumentation. This analysis highlights that the
linkage between trade and privacy will continue to intensify and that
this linkage will be further shaped by countries being taken to court.
Part II provides an introduction to cross-border data flows
regulation and the taxonomies by which to classify them. Part III
addresses cross-border data flows regulation aimed at protecting
privacy, analyzing the regulatory approaches of adequacy and
accountability. Part IV discusses the framing of these measures under
the WTO services regime, surveying the main applicable provisions of
the GATS and then focusing on possible claims regarding WTOinconsistency, ultimately arguing that the necessity test and the
chapeau requirements in the GATS exceptions will prove the highest
hurdle for a respondent country.
II. CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS REGULATION
This Part introduces the concept of cross-border data flows
regulation in the context of international trade. It also reviews some of
the taxonomies that have been proposed to classify regulatory
approaches around the globe, setting the scene for the analysis of
privacy-based restrictions in the next Part.
Cross-border data flow regulations are employed by
governments around the world in response to a variety of concerns
such as cybersecurity, privacy, banking and financial supervision,
consumer protection, or economic protectionism, to name a few. 2

See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64(3) EMORY L. J. 677,
713 (2015).

2

2020

PRIVACY BEFORE TRADE

95

Although privacy-based restrictions on data transfers 3 have generally
been analyzed from the perspective of data protection law, addressing
them as a subset of cross-border data flow regulations places these
restrictions within a broader regulatory context and helps assess them
in the light of the trade regime.
The OECD defines cross-border data flow regulations as
“measures that affect the possibility of exchanging and moving data
across borders.” 4 In terms of trade, restrictions on data flows have the
effect of raising the cost of conducting business across borders by
obligating companies to store data within a country’s territory or
imposing requirements for data to be transferred abroad. 5
Several different taxonomies have been proposed to group the
variety of regulatory approaches to cross-border data transfers
adopted around the world. Despite differences in criteria, all
classifications identify the extent of regulatory interference with data
transfers as the key factor. Regulatory approaches are generally placed
along a spectrum of increasing regulatory presence, ranging from a
total absence of regulation, to moderate levels of regulatory incursion,
and up to highly restrictive regimes. There is not one single taxonomy
of cross-border data regulations that can be singled out as the most
precise to the exclusion of all others; they are all useful models to
analyze differing approaches. Since these taxonomies are drawn from
real-world cases, they serve as frameworks to better understand how
the varying degrees of government intervention affect data transfers.
The taxonomy set forth by the OECD focuses on the degree of
restrictiveness. It is composed of three main categories: regulations
allowing for the free flow of data; regulations making data flow
conditional on safeguards; and regulations making data flow

Although there are distinctions between personal data protection and privacy
protection, for the purposes of this paper the two concepts are employed
interchangeably.
4
Francesca Casalini & Javier Lopez Gonzalez, TRADE AND CROSS-BORDER DATA
FLOWS, OECD TRADE POLICY PAPERS, NO. 220, 11, OECD PUB. (2019),
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/trade/trade-and-cross-border-data-flows_b2023a47en#page11 [hereinafter OECD Report].
5
Martina Ferracane, Restrictions on Cross-Border data flows: a taxonomy 2 (ECIPE,
Working Paper No. 1, 2017), https://ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/
Restrictions-on-cross-border-data-flows-a-taxonomy-final1.pdf.
3
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conditional on ad-hoc authorization. 6 The types of regulations that may
present trade law challenges will fall under the second and third
categories, which present tangible government action and imposition
of restrictions on cross-border transfers. The second category
comprises approaches that require the fulfilment of certain conditions
to allow for data transfers; there are different subcategories depending
on the responsible authority and the method for establishing these
conditions, and the alternative means available for transfers in the
absence of such conditions. Generally, these subcategories include
adequacy or equivalence findings by private entities or government
agencies, and alternatives like undertakings by data exporters,
contractual agreements, or data subject consent. The third category
comprises approaches that limit the alternatives to an adequacy
finding by a public authority, requiring ad-hoc government approval
or directly subjecting all transfers to government review.
Another taxonomy, proposed by Martina Ferracane, focuses
on the nature of the restrictions to cross-border data flows and
classifies them into strict and conditional. Strict restrictions are those
imposing data localization requirements or banning transfers outright,
while a conditional regime subjects cross-border transfers to certain
conditions. 7 The types of privacy-oriented regulations that are the
focus of this paper will generally fall under the second group. These
conditions might be applicable to the country where the data will be
received, the company carrying out the transfers, or both the recipient
country and the company. Data flows regimes usually require the
fulfilment of one specific condition or one among alternative options,
but in some cases the conditions might be so stringent as to result in
an outright ban on the transfer.
Finally, Christopher Kuner distinguishes between two
opposing “default regulatory positions” in cross-border data flow
regulations. On one end are frameworks that allow data transfers by
default and enable regulators to block or limit them, while on the other
are those that prohibit data flows unless there is a specific legal basis
for transfer. 8 Writing from the standpoint of privacy, Kuner proposes
OECD Report, supra note 4, at 16-21.
Ferracane, supra note 5, at 3-4.
8
CHRISTOPHER KUNER, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS
(2013).
6
7

AND

DATA PRIVACY LAW 76
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a classification of cross-border data flow regulations that aligns neatly
with Ferracane’s definition of conditional regimes with restrictions
applicable either to the recipient country or to the entity handling the
data. This classification will be the basis of the next Part.
III. PRIVACY-BASED DATA RESTRICTIONS
This Part deals with cross-border data flow regulations
particularly addressing privacy. It first introduces the two main
regulatory approaches to privacy-based restrictions, adequacy and
accountability, and then surveys comparative examples of each model.
The most salient model to assess “privacy protection
frameworks addressing cross-border data transfers” 9 has been
proposed by Kuner, who distinguishes between “geographicallyThe
based”
and
“organizationally-based”
approaches. 10
geographically-based or “adequacy” approach focuses on the country
or location where the data are transferred; it is the one adopted by the
EU and several other countries. It presents a variety of tests applied to
the legal regime of the receiving country turning on its adequacy,
equivalence, or comparability to the home jurisdiction. The
organizationally-based or “accountability” approach focuses on the
entities and organization that control the data; it is most prominently
featured in the APEC Privacy Framework, entrusting data exporting
companies with guaranteeing a certain level of treatment on the
personal data that is transferred. Several privacy regimes present an
overlap or coexistence between both approaches by offering the choice
between alternative mechanisms for data transfers. The GDPR, for
instance, adopts an adequacy requirement but also recognizes
accountability instruments like binding corporate rules and standard
contractual clauses.
A.

Geographically-Based or Adequacy Approach

The geographically-based approach regulates data transfers
based on the level of data protection in place in the receiving or
9
Rolf H. Weber, Regulatory Autonomy and Privacy Standards under the GATS, 7
ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 25, 31 (2012).
10
KUNER, supra note 8, at 64-76.
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importing country. According to this approach, the legal system of the
receiving or importing country must assure a certain level of
protection comparable to that of the exporting country for transfers to
be permitted. 11
This condition is met by establishing the adequacy or
equivalence between the two legal frameworks. Although generally
discussed jointly, equivalence entails a level of objective similarity
between two regulations in terms of tools used and objectives of the
regulation while adequacy is more flexible as it focuses on a common
agreed outcome but allows for different tools to achieve it. The most
famous example of this model is the requirement of an “adequate level
of protection” established by the EU, 12 and hence this approach is
generally identified as “adequacy.”
The adequacy of the receiving country’s level of data
protection is usually determined by a public body such as the data
protection authority or a higher political authority. Such
determination can be adopted as a unilateral recognition, with one
country establishing the adequacy of another and allowing the transfer
of data to that destination, or a mutual recognition between two or
more countries enabling free flows of data among them. This mutual
type of recognition can be implemented through an arrangement
between data protection agencies or be included in a broader
agreement such as an FTA.
In practical terms, the adequacy approach implies that the
domestic data protection laws of one country or jurisdiction will
determine the minimum standards that others must meet in order to
be recipients of data transfers from it. Thus, this approach could be
used by a government as an incentive for others to enact data
protection laws with a certain content in order to attract data exports.
When the sovereign enacting the baseline level of protection has a
significant trade and political influence, this approach serves as an
effective way of exporting its regulatory standards. In fact,
encouraging the adoption of similar regulation by other countries is
cited as motivating the inclusion of this approach in the earlier EU
Directive. 13
11

Id.
Id.; see infra Part III.C.i.
13
KUNER, supra note 8, at 66.
12
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When considering the economic and business implications of
an adequacy determination, it is easy to see the potential political
underpinnings of any such decision. A country’s determination of
whether another country provides a comparable, equivalent, or
adequate level of protection to personal data is a kind of judgment on
a foreign regulatory system which may well be guided by political
considerations. In the EU context, Kuner documents some examples of
politics influencing adequacy determinations by the Commission. 14
Therefore, the procedures by which adequacy or equivalence
decisions are adopted play an important role, especially when
measured by objective standards as mandated by WTO caselaw. For
instance, the OECD states that very few countries establish publicly
the substantive criteria used to determine adequacy in data protection
laws and regulations and recommends that these criteria and
processes should be transparent, non-discriminatory, and avoid
unnecessary trade restrictiveness, among other conditions. 15
The adequacy approach does not generally appear as the sole
mechanism for data transfers within individual privacy regimes.
Countries that follow this approach tend to also offer alternative
accountability mechanisms to enable data transfers in the absence of
an adequacy determination, such as contractual arrangements or the
consent of the data subject.
B.

Organizationally Based or Accountability Approach

The organizationally based approach regulates the treatment
by companies and other organizations of the data that is transferred
across borders. These organizations are made “accountable” for the
processing of personal data according to specified privacy principles
regardless of the location where the data are processed. 16 The
accountability approach does not restrict cross-border data flows but
imposes responsibilities on the parties that transfer data.
Under this approach, the protection is based on specific
obligations established under the law of the data controller that
continue to apply to the personal data after it crosses national borders.
14

Id.
OECD Report, supra note 4, at 20.
16
KUNER, supra note 8, at 71.
15
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The specific principles vary among different models following this
approach, as do the ways of instrumenting these obligations. Two
common forms of the accountability approach are binding corporate
rules and standard contractual clauses.
Binding corporate rules impose obligations on companies with
operations in different countries in terms of data protection. Adopting
and implementing binding corporate rules allows multinational firms
to move data across borders - although only among the firms’ affiliates
in different countries - independently of the individual countries’
consideration of one another’s data protection frameworks. These
instruments usually must be previously approved by data protection
authorities in the countries involved, which can involve lengthy
procedures. 17
Standard contractual clauses are rules used in transactions
involving the cross-border transfer of personal data to third parties.
These clauses are usually developed or approved by data protection
authorities and, upon their inclusion in contracts, are deemed as
sufficiently protective of the data that are transferred, regardless of the
destination country. They are a convenient mechanism in terms of
applicability but may include onerous conditions and increase
administrative costs. 18
Accountability instruments are often established in privacy
regimes as safeguards or alternative mechanisms to enable crossborder data transfers in the absence of another “main” legal ground
such as an adequacy finding.
C.

Comparative Examples19
i.

Adequacy: The European Union

The regime that gives name to the adequacy approach is the
EU, currently governed by the General Data Protection Regulation
OECD Report, supra note 4, at 21.
Id. at 22.
19
See generally Ferracane, supra note 5, at 10-27; Rachel F. Fefer, Data Flows, Online
Privacy, and Trade Policy, R45584 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Mar. 26,
2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45584; GLOBAL LEGAL
GROUP, THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: DATA PROTECTION
17
18
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(GDPR). 20 Under the GDPR, personal data can be transferred from the
EU to third countries that provide an “adequate level of protection,” 21
which must be established through an adequacy finding by the
European Commission. The considerations that go into an adequacy
finding are also listed in the GDPR and include the existence of the rule
of law; legislation including public security, national security, and
criminal law; whether there are effectively enforceable rights including
administrative and judicial redress for data subjects; and any
international commitments entered into by the third country. 22
While adequacy determinations may take into account
different approaches to privacy protection such as self‐regulation by
firms, in practice such findings have all been made regarding countries
whose privacy regimes are essentially equivalent to the EU: 23
comprehensive laws that provide a level of data protection,
government access and rights of redress consistent with EU standards.
An adequacy finding may also be made with respect to specific
economic sectors or territories within a third country, 24 which until
recently covered the EU-US Privacy Shield. Concluded in 2016, the EU‐
US Privacy Shield governed transfers of personal data between the EU
and participating businesses in the United States. 25 Though not a third
country national framework, the Privacy Shield per se was originally
found by the European Commission as providing an adequate level of
2019 (6th ed. 2019); Aaditya Mattoo & Joshua P. Meltzer, International Data Flows
and Privacy. The Conflict and Its Resolution, WORLD BANK GROUP POLICY RESEARCH
WORKING PAPER 8431, 25-26 (2018), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
751621525705087132/pdf/WPS8431.pdf.
20
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, https://eurlex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj [hereinafter GDPR].
21
Id. at Article 45.
22
Id. at Article 45.2.
23
Mattoo & Meltzer, supra note 19, at 9.
24
GDPR, supra note 20, at Article 45.3.
25
The Privacy Shield was adopted to replace the EU‐US Safe Harbor arrangement
after it was found by the Court of Justice of the EU as not providing an adequate level
of protection. See Court of Justice of the European Union Case C-362/14, Maximilian
Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
liste.jsf?num=C-362/14.
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protection, but was recently invalidated by the Court of Justice of the
EU. 26 This arrangement established a series of principles, largely
reflecting EU law, with which U.S. companies self‐certified to the U.S.
Department of Commerce that they would comply in processing
personal data. 27 These features make such an arrangement more
challenging to classify, as the data transfers are allowed by an
adequacy finding but the actual obligations and responsibilities are
undertaken by the businesses, which could suggest listing this
approach as an organizationally-based one.
The GDPR also provides a series of safeguards to enable crossborder transfers to countries that do not have an adequacy finding: 28
binding corporate rules, contractual clauses, codes of conduct, and
certification mechanisms. These are accountability instruments that
seek to ensure protection based on EU law and that must be previously
approved by the Commission or a Member State’s privacy authority.
Binding corporate rules (BCRs) are policies consistent with the
GDPR which are adhered to by a controller or processor established in
the territory of a Member State for transfers of personal data to a
controller or processor in one or more third countries within a single
conglomerate or within a group of enterprises engaged in a joint
economic activity. 29 BCRs must be legally applied and confer
enforceable rights on data subjects, 30 and there must exist a controller
or processor established in a Member State who can be held liable for
breach. 31
While BCRs are only available for transfers among corporate
affiliates, standard contractual clauses (SCCs) are available to all
companies, and they should ensure the same levels of protection,

26
Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy
of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1; see
Court of Justice of the European Union Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v.
Facebook Ireland Ltd., Maximilian Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶¶ 1-16 (July 16,
2020).
27
Id. at ¶¶14-63.
28
GDPR, supra note 20, at Article 46.
29
Id. at Article 47.
30
Id. at Article 47.2.
31
Id. at Article 47.2(f).
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oversight and access for individuals consistent with the GDPR as an
adequacy decision would. 32
Codes of conduct can apply to associations representing
controllers or processors and can be used to ensure compliance with
the GDPR standards. 33 These instruments must be approved by the
Commission and be subject to monitoring and enforcement by an
accredited entity within a Member State. 34
Certification mechanisms allow the development of data
protection seals and marks to demonstrate compliance with GDPR by
processors and controllers within the EU. These mechanisms can also
be used by businesses outside of the EU and serve as a basis for data
transfers. 35
Finally, the GDPR also contains exceptions (“derogations”) to
circumvent these requirements, including consent by the data subject
and transfers necessary to perform a contract or for the purpose of a
legitimate interest, among others. 36
ii. Other Adequacy Models
There are several other examples of the adequacy approach
following the EU model, with variations and sometimes similar
safeguards or alternatives.
In Switzerland, personal data may only be transferred to
countries that provide an “adequate” level of protection, or pursuant
to other arrangements such as a contract or binding corporate rules,
for specific public policy purposes, or with the data subject’s consent. 37
Russia’s Data Protection Law, besides establishing local storage and
processing requirements, 38 allows transfers to countries that Russia

Id. at Article 46.2(c)-(d).
GDPR, supra note 20, at Article 40.
34
Id. at Article 41.
35
Id. at Article 42.
36
Id. at Article 49.
37
BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DEN DATENSCHUTZ [DSG], LOI FÉDÉRALE SUR LA PROTECTION
DES DONNÉES [LPD], LEGGE FEDERALE SULLA PROTEZIONE DEI DATI [LPD] [FEDERAL
ACT ON DATA PROTECTION (FADP)] Jun. 19, 1992, SR 235.1, Art. 6 (Switz.).
38
Federal’nyi Zakon RF ot 21 iiulia 2014 g. No. 242-FZ [Federal Law of the Russian
Federation of 21 July 2014 No. 242-FZ], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI
32
33
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recognizes as offering adequate protection or that are parties to the
Council of Europe Convention 108, 39 or with prior consent of the data
subject. 40
In Israel, transfers are permitted to EU Member States, other
parties to Council of Europe Convention 108, and other countries that
are recipients from EU Member States. Apart from these, transfers are
permitted with data subject consent or as part of contractual
arrangements ensuring compliance with Israeli standards. 41 In Turkey,
personal data cannot be processed or transferred abroad without the
individual’s consent; but it is not required where the transfer is
necessary to exercise a right or is required by law, and the recipient
country provides sufficient protection or the data controller makes a
security undertaking and is granted permission by Turkey’s Personal
Data Protection Board. 42
Under Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Act, a company
may only transfer personal data to recipient countries that provide a
“comparable” level of protection (or with consent of the individual)
and must ensure compliance with the Act’s obligations while
controlling the data. 43 In Japan, the Act on the Protection of Personal
Information (APPI) allows transfers to countries designated as having
an “acceptable” level of protection, to a third party abroad that ensures
the same level of protection as in Japan, for example through
contractual arrangements, or with the data subject’s consent. 44
In Latin America, several countries have followed the EU
model closely. For instance, Argentina’s Data Protection Law prohibits
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2014, No. 30,
Item 4243, Art. 2.
39
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing
of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No.108.
40
Federal’nyi Zakon RF ot 27 iiulia 2006 g. No. 152-FZ [Federal Law of the Russian
Federation of 27 July 2006 No. 152-FZ], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2006, No. 31,
Item 3451, Art. 12.
41
Protection of Privacy Law, 5741 – 1981, 5 LSI 136 (5741-1980/81) (Isr.); Privacy
Protection (Transfer of Data to Databases Abroad) Regulations, 5761-2001, KT 6113
p. 900 (Isr.).
42
Law on the Protection of Personal Data, Law No. 6698 of 2016, Art. 9 (Turk.).
43
Personal Data Protection Act, Act No. 26 of 2012, Art. 26 (Sing.).
44
Kojin jōhō no hogo ni kansuru hōritsu [Act on the Protection of Personal
Information (APPI)], Act No. 57 of 2003, arts. 23-24 (Japan).
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transfers to countries that do not provide an “adequate” level of
protection, 45 which can be circumvented by agreement between the
data controller and the foreign processor ensuring compliance with the
local standards of protection, or with the data subject’s consent. 46
Colombia also restricts transfers to countries that do not offer
“adequate” standards of protection, except with express authorization
by the data subject, for specific types of data or in the context of
international conventions. 47 In Peru, transfers of personal data can
only be made if the destination country offers “adequate” protection
equivalent to the Personal Data Protection Law or international
standards, if the controller ensures compliance with such standards
(for example, contractually), or with the data subject’s consent. 48
iii. Accountability: The APEC CBPR
One of the most relevant examples of the accountability
approach is the Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) mechanism
adopted to facilitate personal data transfers among Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries. The CBPRs require
businesses to develop policies based on the APEC Privacy
Framework, 49 a set of guiding principles based on the OECD
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data. The businesses’ policies and practices must be certified
by APEC Accountability Agents as consistent with the CBPR
requirements; APEC Accountability Agents together with national
Privacy Enforcement Authorities are responsible for enforcing
compliance. 50 Any APEC country can agree to this system unilaterally,
Law No. 25,326, Oct. 4, 2000, B.O. 29,517, Art. 12 (Arg.).
Decree No. 1558, Nov. 29, 2001, B.O. 29,787, Art. 12 (Arg.).
47
L. 1581/12, octubre 17, 2012, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 48587, Art. 26 (Colom.).
48
Law No. 29,733, Jul. 2, 2011, E.P. 445746, Art. 15 (Peru).
49
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], APEC Privacy Framework,
APEC#217-CT-01.9 (2015), https://www.apec.org/-/media/APEC/Publications/2017
/8/APEC-Privacy-Framework-(2015)/217_ECSG_2015-APEC-Privacy-Framework.
pdf.
50
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules
System (2019), http://cbprs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/4.-CBPR-PoliciesRules-and-Guidelines-Revised-For-Posting-3-16-updated-1709-2019.pdf;
AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules System
45
46
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and businesses that are subject to the country’s laws will be able to use
it. To date, the participating economies are the United States, Mexico,
Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Chinese Taipei, and
Singapore. 51
iv. Other Accountability Models
In Australia, a company transferring personal data abroad
must take steps to ensure that the recipient will comply with the
Australian Privacy Principles (APPs). This requirement is excepted if
the recipient is bound by similar legal and enforceable requirements
or the data subject consents, however a company may be held liable
for breaches of the APPs by the recipient. 52
In Canada, under the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), a company transferring data
abroad must grant a comparable level of protection while it is
processed by a third party, preferably through contractual
arrangements. Data subject consent is not required as the law does not
distinguish between domestic and international transfers. 53
In New Zealand, consent is not required for data transfers to
third countries in compliance with the Information Privacy Principles,
but substantive protections continue to apply to the personal and
health information even when outside of the country. 54
South Africa requires data subject consent for cross-border
transfers, but this can be waived if the recipient is subject to laws,
binding corporate rules or agreements providing an adequate level of
protection, or the transfer is necessary as part of a contract between the

Program Requirements (2019), http://cbprs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/5.Cross-Border-Privacy-Rules-Program-Requirements-updated-17-09-2019.pdf; AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], APEC Cooperation Arrangement for CrossBorder Privacy Enforcement (2019), http://cbprs.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/1.Cross-Border-Privacy-Enforcement-Arrangement-updated-17-09-2019.pdf.
51
ABOUT CBPRS, http://cbprs.org/about-cbprs/ (last visited May 12, 2020).
52
Federal Privacy Act 1988 (Sch 1 Pt 3) s. 8 (Austl.).
53
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, div
1, s. 5, Schedule 1 (Can.).
54
Privacy Act 1993, s. 114B (N.Z.).
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data subject and the responsible party or to implement pre-contractual
measures following the data subject’s request. 55
IV.

PRIVACY -BASED DATA RESTRICTIONS IN THE WTO
FRAMEWORK

This Part places privacy-based cross-border data flow
regulations within the multilateral trade regime. Although there are
suggestions that some operations involving digital services could be
considered as trade in goods, 56 the prevailing view identifies the
services regime as the appropriate framework governing cross-border
data flow regulations. 57 After an introduction to the WTO regulation
of trade in services, this Part presents the possible discussions on the
WTO-consistency of a measure and then focuses on the exceptions
framework, which will be the ultimate line of argumentation for the
legality of any such regulation.
A.

The WTO Trade in Services Framework

Under the WTO regime, the GATS 58 establishes two types of
obligations on Members: general obligations and specific
commitments. General obligations are owed with respect to all
Members and all sectors, while specific commitments are undertaken
by Members for the sectors and modes of supply that they expressly
set out. 59

Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 § 72 (S. Afr.).
Andrew D. Mitchell, & Jarrod Hepburn, Don’t Fence Me In: Reforming Trade and
Investment Law to Better Facilitate Cross-Border Data Transfers, 19 YALE J. L. &
TECH. 182, 196-97 (2017); MacDonald & Streatfeild, supra note 1, at 633.
57
Mattoo & Meltzer, supra note 19, at 16; Crosby, supra note 1, at 2; Willemyns,
supra note 1, at 6-12; Andrew D. Mitchell & Neha Mishra, Data at the Docks:
Modernizing International Trade Law for the Digital Economy, 20 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 1073, 1088-97 (2018).
58
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183
[hereinafter GATS].
59
MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & MICHAEL
HAHN, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW PRACTICE, AND POLICY 557-59 (3rd
ed. 2015).
55
56
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Among the general obligations, the most-favored-nation
(MFN) principle established in Article II provides that Members must
“accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service
suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it
accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country.” 60
The MFN obligation prevents Members from granting preferable
treatment to some Members to the detriment of others.
This principle is subject to limited exceptions. Most
importantly, Article V enables Members to conclude agreements
further liberalizing trade in services as long as the agreements have
substantial sectoral coverage and substantially eliminate all
discrimination among the parties. 61 This provision is sister to GATT
Article XXIV and provides the legal basis for services chapters in
FTAs. 62
As for the specific commitments, the method for liberalizing
trade in services is fundamentally different from the goods regime.
Under the GATT, each Member adopts a Schedule of Concessions that
limits the tariffs that they may impose on goods from other Members. 63
By contrast, the GATS, reflecting a greater reluctance by Members to
open their services markets, adopts a “positive list” approach 64 where
each Member undertakes commitments to liberalize trade in specific
sectors in its territory. 65
In its Schedule of Specific Commitments, each Member must
specify the terms, limitations, conditions, and time frames that it
applies to each covered sector. 66 Moreover, specific commitments are
undertaken not only by sector but also by mode of supply. The four
modes of supply covered by the GATS, identified by their order in the
list, are (1) cross-border, from one Member’s territory into another
Member’s territory; (2) consumption abroad, in one Member’s
GATS, supra note 58, at Article II(1).
Id. at Article V(1).
62
MATSUSHITA, ET AL., supra note 59, at 573-76.
63
GATS, supra note 58, at Article II.
64
MacDonald & Streatfeild, supra note 1, at 633.
65
In more recent agreements on services, this method has been gradually replaced by
a “negative list” approach where parties by default undertake to liberalize all trade in
services and must include in their schedules those sectors and modes that they wish to
exempt.
66
GATS, supra note 58, at Article XX.
60
61
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territory to a consumer of another Member; (3) commercial presence,
by one Member’s service provider through the commercial presence in
another Member’s territory; and (4) presence of natural persons, by
one Member’s service supplier through the presence of natural
persons in the territory of another Member. 67 Thus, within each
possible sector, Members must also detail their commitments for each
mode of supply of that service.
The main specific commitments are market access and national
treatment. 68 Regarding market access in the specified sectors and
modes, Article XVI requires each Member to “accord services and
service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than
that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed
and specified in its Schedule.” 69 Market access is thus limited to the
commitments made by each Member according to its individual policy
and economic objectives. Article XVI (2) lists the possible limitations
that a Member may maintain or adopt, if specified in its Schedule, for
the sectors where commitments are undertaken. These comprise
limitations on number of suppliers, total value of transactions, number
of operations, number of natural persons employed, participation of
foreign capital, or restrictions on permitted types of legal entity. 70
Article XVII enshrines the national treatment principle (NT),
which requires Members to “accord to services and service suppliers
of any other Member (…) treatment no less favorable than that it
accords to its own like services and service suppliers.” 71 As with
market access, this obligation is limited to the sectors and modes
included in the Member’s Schedules, and subject to the conditions and
limitations set out therein.

Id. at Article I(2).
Susannah Hodson, Applying WTO and FTA Disciplines to Data Localization
Measures, 18:4 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 579, 590-92 (2019).
69
GATS, supra note 58, at Article XVI(1).
70
Id. at Article XVI (2) (a)–(f).
71
Id. at Article XVII.
67
68
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Assessing the GATS-Consistency of Data Regulations

Regulations on cross-border data transfers might fall under the
GATS framework in different ways. 72 For instance, technologies
relying on data transfers may enable other categories of covered
services, 73 such as international electronic payment services or other
services, not necessarily digital, that can be provided electronically
across borders. 74 Moreover, data-related services such as database and
data processing services may be specifically disciplined in Members’
schedules and thus be subject to market access and national treatment
commitments, 75 although the appropriateness of the GATS
classification scheme to newer digital services is disputed. 76 Further,
the GATS exceptions language is found in new-generation FTAs
liberalizing trade in services, 77 which keeps WTO law and caselaw
relevant to assess the legality of cross-border data flow regulations
under newer instruments.
The GATS-consistency of a restriction on cross-border data
flows restriction could be called into question based on different
grounds.

Crosby, supra note 1, at 3-4; Hodson, supra note 68, at 586; Susan Ariel Aaronson
& Patrick Leblond, Another Digital Divide: The Rise of Data Realms and its
Implications for the WTO, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245, 251-53 (2018).
73
Hodson, supra note 68, at 586-88.
74
Mattoo & Meltzer, supra note 19, at 16.
75
Crosby, supra note 1, at 5-6.
76
See Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note 56, at 197-99; Hodson, supra note 68, at 58182; Mira Burri, The Regulation of Data Flows through Trade Agreements, 48(1) GEO.
J. INT’L L. 407, 410-17 (2017).
77
See, e.g., Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican
States, and Canada (USMCA), Article 32.1.2 (Dec. 13, 2019), https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/
agreement-between (incorporating by reference); Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Article 29.1.3, Mar. 8, 2018,
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/text-texte/index.aspx?lang=eng (incorporating by
reference); Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between
Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other
part, Article 28.3.2 (Oct. 30, 2016, 2017) O.J. (L 11) 23 (EU) (replicating Article XIV
textually).
72
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First, a measure could be alleged to breach a country’s market
access or national treatment obligations. In that case, the assessment
would require analyzing the country’s Schedule of Specific
Commitments. The restriction would need to be applied consistent
with the commitments undertaken by that country — including any
specified limitations and conditions regarding the affected sectors and
modes of supply. In terms of the covered modes, cross-border data
flow restrictions of the type reviewed above may impact the supply of
services under Modes 1 (cross-border), 2 (consumption abroad), or 3
(commercial presence). As for the affected services, there exist
restrictions on data transfers for individual sectors such as banking or
health; these types of regulations may be foreseen in a country’s
schedule.
However, the more recent privacy-oriented restrictions are of
such broad scope that they may potentially affect all services that rely
on data transfers. There is skepticism that a horizontal, sector-blind
measure targeting cross-border data flows could be consistent with
any country’s GATS schedule. 78 To the extent that it remains
technically possible, suffice to say that if a measure were found to be
in accordance with the country’s schedule, the legality analysis would
end there.
Second, a measure could be alleged to breach a country’s
general obligations. A restriction on cross-border data transfers could
result in a trade partner receiving more favorable treatment than
others. For example, if data transfers to a country’s territory or
involving companies subject to its jurisdiction are allowed while those
involving other countries are not, or if they are permitted in more
convenient conditions or subject to fewer restrictions, a prejudiced
country could allege a violation of MFN (Article II).
In this case, the legality of a more favorable treatment accorded
to one or more countries as compared to others could be justified if it
is established through a preferential trade agreement that complies
with Article V, including the notification requirements. 79 But absent a
treaty-based ground to grant preferential treatment to some Members
See, e.g., Nivedita Sen, Understanding the Role of the WTO in International Data
Flows: Taking the Liberalization or the Regulatory Autonomy Path?, 21 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 323, 346 (2018).
79
GATS, supra note 58, at Article V(7).
78
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to the detriment of others, a country would have to justify its measure
as permitted by the General Exceptions, which will be analyzed in the
next section.
C.

GATS General Exceptions

This section addresses the most likely ground for discussion
regarding the WTO-consistency of a cross-border data flows
restriction. When a measure cannot be justified as consistent with the
country’s specific commitments or as falling under an exception to the
MFN obligation, the ultimate line of argumentation on its WTOconsistency will turn upon its justifiability under the GATS General
Exceptions, 80 and particularly the strict requirements of the necessity
test and the chapeau.
GATS Article XIV, closely modeled on GATT Article XX, sets
forth the general exceptions that Members can rely on to depart from
their obligations vis-à-vis other Members and their service providers.
Although there have been very few cases before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) involving Article XIV, the Appellate Body has
established that the jurisprudence on GATT Article XX is relevant to
the interpretation and application of its GATS equivalent. 81
Article XIV, like the GATT clause, provides for a two-tier
analysis by a Panel. The first part consists of establishing if the measure
falls within the scope of one of the exceptions. This means that the
measure must address one of the listed objectives and there must be a
sufficient “nexus” or connection between the measure and the interest
to be protected. This nexus is required by the language of the
exceptions through terms like “necessary to” and “relating to,” and is
thus identified as the necessity test. If the necessity test is fulfilled, the
second part of the analysis consists of determining if the measure
complies with the requirements of the chapeau of Article XIV. 82
Andrew D. Mitchell & Neha Mishra, Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows in a
Data-Driven World: How WTO Law Can Contribute, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 389, 397402 (2019); Mishra, supra note 1, at 9-10.
81
Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶291, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr.
20, 2005) [hereinafter US - Gambling Appellate Body Report]; MATSUSHITA, ET AL,
supra note 59, at 613-15.
82
US - Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, at ¶ 292.
80
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Public Interests

Beginning with the listed exceptions, the two most relevant for
the purposes of data flows regulations are found in subparagraphs (a)
and (c). 83
Article XIV(a) allows for measures “necessary to protect public
morals or to maintain public order.” 84 As stated by the DSB, the
meaning of public morals and public order may vary depending on a
range of factors, and each Member enjoys broad discretion to
determine the level of protection it considers appropriate. 85 However,
footnote 5 to the subparagraph clarifies that public order “may be
invoked only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed
to one of the fundamental interests of society.” 86 This indicates a very
high bar for justification under the public order exception as a country
would need to demonstrate that a data transfer restriction seeks to
address a genuine and serious threat to a fundamental interest.
Conversely, the public morals language appears to preserve a larger
regulatory space, and it would seem like a plausible ground to invoke
to justify a privacy regulation. As for the different approaches to data
transfer regulations protecting privacy, neither seems to fare better
than the other under Article XIV(a) since both adequacy and
accountability models seek to ensure a certain level of protection
identified by the adopting country.
Article XIV(c) allows Members to adopt measures “necessary
to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with [the GATS].” 87 For this exception, the DSB has
applied the approach adopted regarding GATT Article XX(d), which
consists of three steps. A Member must identify the laws or regulations
which the challenged measure is intended to secure compliance with;
then it must prove that those laws or regulations are not inconsistent

Hodson, supra note 68, at 593.
GATS, supra note 58, at Article XIV(a).
85
Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶6.461, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted Apr. 20,
2005).
86
GATS, supra note 58, Article XIV(a), footnote 5.
87
Id. at Article XIV(c)(ii).
83
84
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with the GATS; and demonstrate that the measure is designed to
secure compliance with those laws or regulations. 88
The exception includes a non-exhaustive list of policy
objectives that the laws or regulations may pursue. Most importantly,
(c)(ii) addresses “the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation
to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the
protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts.” 89
This language offers the most appropriate ground for a country to
justify a privacy-based restriction on cross-border data flows; of
course, it would need to identify the substantive protections that the
restriction advances, prove that they are themselves GATS-consistent,
and demonstrate the nexus between the restriction and the substantive
protections. For example, justifying the GDPR restrictions on data
transfers under (c)(ii) would require identifying the substantive
protections and rights enshrined therein, showing their GATSconsistency, and establishing the link between such protections and
the transfer restrictions.
Like with public morals, the wording of this exception does not
seem to favor any privacy approach over the other. Both adequacy and
accountability models seek to ensure that personal data are subject to
a certain substantive protection established in the national laws or
regulations or other instruments, while the differences arise regarding
the focus of such responsibility.
In any case, privacy and public morals are likely to be accepted
as justifications considering the treaty language, 90 and thus a measure
would be easily found to fall under subparagraphs (a) or (c). The
biggest hurdles will appear in the necessity and the chapeau parts of
the analysis.
ii. Necessity
Having determined that a measure falls under one of the
Article XIV exceptions, the respondent Member must demonstrate that
Panel Report, Argentina - Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
¶¶7.595-7.596, WTO Doc. WT/DS453/R (adopted May 9, 2016) [hereinafter
Argentina–Financial Services Panel Report].
89
GATS, supra note 58, at Article XIV(c)(ii).
90
Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note 56, at 202-03.
88
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the measure is “necessary to” achieve the stated objective. The DSB has
established this requirement as a high threshold for respondent
countries, significantly closer to the level of “indispensable” than to
that of just “making a contribution to.” 91 This standard demands a
strong connection between the measure and the protected interest,
which must be established through the “necessity test,” a holistic
evaluation that involves “weighing and balancing a series of factors.” 92
Although the DSB caselaw does not establish an exhaustive
series of factors to be considered, the process of weighing and
balancing generally involves assessing the relative importance of the
interests or objectives underlying the measure; the contribution of the
measure to the realization of the objective; and the restrictive impact
of the measure on international trade. 93 Although the standard of
necessity is objective, a Member’s characterization of the measure’s
objectives and its regulatory approach are considered relevant to the
evaluation. 94 The elements of contribution and trade-restrictiveness
present the more challenging questions: the stronger the contribution
of a measure to its objective, the greater trade-restrictiveness is likely
to be tolerated; and the more trade-restrictive a measure, the greater
the contribution to the objective that the Member must demonstrate. 95
The final part of the necessity test consists of determining
whether there exists a less trade-restrictive alternative measure that is
reasonably available to the Member. 96 This requires a comparison
between the measure and possible alternatives, with the burden of
proof falling on the complaining Member to put forward the latter. 97
An alternative measure would not be considered reasonably available
if it is merely theoretical, for example if the Member is not capable of
taking it, or if it imposes an undue burden on the Member, such as
prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties. 98 Moreover, a
reasonably available alternative measure must be able to preserve the
MacDonald & Streatfeild, supra note 1, at 639-40.
US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, at ¶¶ 306–07.
93
Id. at ¶¶ 306–07; MATSUSHITA, ET AL, supra note 59, at 615-17.
94
US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, at ¶ 304.
95
Mitchell, & Hepburn, supra note 56, at 204.
96
US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, at ¶¶ 304-05.
97
Id. at ¶¶ 309–10.
98
Hodson, supra note 68, at 594.
91
92
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right of a Member to achieve its desired level of protection regarding
the objective pursued. 99
This stage of the analysis presents the bigger challenges when
assessing privacy-based restrictions. Among the factors indicated for
weighing and balancing, the objectives underlying the measure will
generally point to the country’s identification of its public policy
interests. Since Article XIV expressly mentions public morals and
privacy, the necessity analysis would focus on the measure’s
contribution to the stated objective, its trade-restrictive impact, and the
availability of alternative measures.
Here, countries enforcing strict restrictions like local storage or
processing requirements, which are expected to have a highly
restrictive impact on trade, will face a high burden to demonstrate the
measure’s contribution to the stated objective. Indeed, it has been
suggested that data localization measures in themselves may not
improve security or privacy, and thus may not meet the necessity
test. 100 Moreover, possible alternative measures that have a less
restrictive impact have been suggested, although their availability
would depend on the country’s technical resources. 101
Conditional restrictions protecting privacy, however, are in a
grayer area. Among the two representative approaches to cross-border
data regulations (adequacy and accountability), it does not seem as
either would be per se easier to justify under this test than the other. In
any case, a respondent country would need to demonstrate that the
measure contributes to data protection in a way that is proportional to
the trade-restrictive impact, and there is not one particular regulatory
approach that implies in itself a greater contribution to privacy or a
deeper impact on trade. Assessing any individual measure would
require a close analysis of the legal instrument and its actual impact,
which might be technically challenging.
Further, the very existence of different regulatory approaches,
and the coexistence of elements from both approaches within several
individual regimes, would suggest the availability of alternative
measures. The evaluation and comparison of each type of measure’s
trade impact and availability to a country is an exercise that the DSB,
US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 81, at ¶ 308.
Sen, supra note 78, at 337.
101
Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note 56, at 204.
99
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and even the parties to a dispute, might not be technically prepared to
engage in.
This serves to illustrate that the necessity test implies a level of
examination and analysis that could call any regime into question. The
success of any questioned country’s defense under this test will hinge
on its ability to justify its regulatory choices and show that no less
restrictive measure could achieve the same objective. Even considering
that a measure satisfies the necessity test, it would still have to meet
the chapeau requirements, which might constitute the biggest hurdle
for an Article XIV defense.
iii. Chapeau
If the necessity test is passed, the last part of the analysis will
be determining if the measure complies with the Article XIV chapeau.
The chapeau, phrased in very similar terms to GATT Article XX,
requires that the measures “are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
trade in services.” 102
This text bars three types of effects that may arise from the
application of a measure: arbitrary discrimination between countries
with like conditions, unjustifiable discrimination between countries
with like conditions, or a disguised restriction on trade in services. In
GATT disputes, arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination have
generally been addressed together; if there is either arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries or a disguised trade
restriction, the conclusion is that the measure cannot be justified under
the provision. 103
Moreover, the DSB has highlighted the use of the word
“applied,” suggesting that the focus of the analysis should be on how
a measure is implemented and operates in practice. 104 Any
arbitrariness or discrimination in the application of the measure will
thus make its justification under the chapeau more difficult. For
GATS, supra note 58, at Article XIV.
Argentina–Financial Services Panel Report, supra note 88, at ¶¶ 7.745-7.746.
104
Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note 56, at 204-05; MATSUSHITA, ET AL, supra note 59,
at 620-21.
102
103
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example, if data transfers are allowed to particular countries or by
particular companies without the fulfilment of requirements that are
imposed on others, or a set of legal standards is not applied
consistently among countries, justification under the chapeau would
be problematic. Moreover, arbitrariness, discrimination or a disguised
restriction could be established if national service providers are
exempt from prohibitions that prevent or limit data transfers by
foreign companies.
Here, some distinction might be drawn between the chances
for success of the two leading privacy approaches. Of course, any
measure would have to be analyzed individually in terms of its
application and effect. However, the respective regulatory approaches
of the adequacy and accountability models present differences that
might help predict which type of model could be more likely to be
found in violation of the chapeau. The adequacy approach conditions
data transfers upon the recipient country’s privacy protections, while
the accountability approach focuses on the responsible company
committing to protect the data according to specified standards.
As such, adequacy determinations involve one country’s
decision regarding another’s legal regime and can result in a ban of
transfers to a country deemed to provide “inadequate” protection, or
at least an additional cost for companies needing to adjust their
operations to abide by any applicable safeguards. In that case, a
respondent country would be obliged to demonstrate that the criteria
for an adequacy determination are not applied arbitrarily or in a
discriminatory manner, overcoming any suspicions about political
motivations. 105
Accountability models, on the other hand, are generally
implemented as requirements in abstract that all companies must
comply with regardless of their nationality. Although there could be
arbitrariness, discrimination, or a disguised restriction aimed at
particular companies, for example to benefit a local firm, the
See Gianpaolo M. Ruotolo, The EU data protection regime and the multilateral
trading system: Where dream and day unite, 51 QIL 5, 25-28 (2018), and Stefano N.
Saluzzo, Cross Border Data Flows and International Trade Law. The Relationship
between EU Data Protection Law and the GATS, XXXI(4) DIRITTO DEL COMMERCIO
INTERNAZIONALE 807, 828 (2017) (suggesting that the GDPR might be incompatible
with the chapeau).
105
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regulatory approach is less likely to be used against a particular
country.
Furthermore, it seems a more plausible scenario for a country
to bring a complaint before the DSB against another Member’s
measure barring all transfers to its territory due to its “inadequacy”
than to do so out of a refusal to recognize as valid an individual
company’s binding corporate rules or contractual arrangements.
V.

CONCLUSION

This paper has explored the linkage between cross-border data
flow regulations aimed at protecting privacy and the multilateral trade
regime. These two spheres of regulation are growing closer as data
transfers, and especially those involving personal data, become ever
more central to the global economy. It is thus a matter of time before
legal challenges to regulations that are perceived to disguise
protectionism or discrimination against countries or firms are brought
before international dispute settlement fora.
In this sense, the paper has established that privacy-based
restrictions may be challenged under the GATS. Should that happen,
respondent countries would be forced to justify their measures either
as permitted by their GATS obligations or as covered by an exception.
In the first case, a measure could be justified if it is covered by a
respondent’s specific commitments, which seems unlikely for a
horizontal measure targeting all sectors. Otherwise, a challenge
invoking a breach of MFN treatment could be survived if a “more
favorable” treatment regarding data transfers were arranged through
an FTA covered by Article V.
As for the GATS exceptions, privacy-based restrictions are
likely to fall within Article XIV(a) or (c), but a respondent country
would face a very high threshold to pass the necessity test and
demonstrate compliance with the Article XIV chapeau. Regarding the
latter, adequacy regimes could be especially difficult to justify if they
are applied in a way that discriminates against certain countries (i.e.,
if adequacy determinations are granted or refused based on grounds
that cannot survive the chapeau requirements). It remains to be seen
whether the harmful effects of a particular restriction could be
sufficiently quantifiable, or the discriminatory treatment sufficiently
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demonstrable, for a country to bring suit before the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body or other fora.
In any case, the implications for trade and privacy are vast and
wide-ranging. With digital trade at center stage, data flows are crucial
to the global economy. At the same time, countries concerned with
protecting public policy interests affected by data flows, such as
privacy, engage in domestic regulation with potentially significant
trade implications. The international trade regime provides binding
dispute settlement mechanisms offering a unique way for affected
countries to bring claims against data regulations. By assessing the
hurdles for justification of privacy-based restrictions under WTO law,
this paper shows how the trade arena may shape the regulation of
privacy in years to come. If litigation over such restrictions results in
specific features of privacy regulations being considered inconsistent
with WTO obligations, countries may be incentivized to make
adjustments in order to avoid complaints. Moreover, WTO
negotiations on electronic commerce or digital services would very
likely deal with disciplines on privacy regulations, which would have
to be able to pass muster under the GATS exceptions framework.
Even considering the WTO’s delay in achieving new rules and
the current situation at the Appellate Body, which could render WTO
dispute settlement ineffective, the potential GATS-inconsistency of
data regulations is also relevant to new-generation FTAs. With FTAs
replicating the GATS exceptions language, binding dispute settlement
under these newer instruments might also contribute to shaping
privacy law by the application of the necessity analysis or by
“importing” a potential WTO caselaw on the matter.
In short, this paper highlights the inextricable link between the
fields of trade and privacy. Cross-border data flow regulations
protecting privacy necessarily have implications for international
trade. At the same time, the trade regime involves rules that, if
disputed and applied, might end up invalidating some of these
regulations. As this paper has shown, the ultimate line of
argumentation for a country facing a complaint over a data regulation
would be the GATS exceptions necessity test and chapeau
requirements, and it remains to be seen whether any respondent
country could win the day.

